Non-Technical Summary
In early 1998 Gaddy and Ickes suggested a new idea explaining why the Russian transition apparently failed.
2 Managers of economically bankrupt companies have preserved price distortions inherited from the Soviet time by exploiting political connections that they had developed during the time of command economy. They overcharged customers in barter transactions and created the pretense that the firms are economically viable. In their turn, the customers accepted "bad" deals because they have reduced nominal barter prices to market levels by employing offsets and accumulating arrears. The bill has been ultimately passed to the government through tax offsets. The latter is reluctant to expose the pretense because otherwise, it faces mass unemployment and subsequent political instability.
Following this logic, Gaddy and Ickes have inferred that the emphasis on preserving the nominal value of GDP in transition is wrong. If authorities press for settlement in money, the non-productive nature of many companies becomes obvious. Gaddy and Ickes have predicted that when it happens, the Russian economy contracts in the short run in absolute numbers but positions itself for the long-term growth by freeing resources that the value-destroying companies wasted before.
The default that happened in August 1998 seemingly justified their point of view. As the market exchange rate soared from 5,974 to 21,140 Rubles to the US Dollar, the dollar estimate of the Russian GDP fell from $ 414,897 million in 1997 to $ 127,548 million in 1998. 3 The notion that Russia had developed a peculiar form of "virtual economy" gained prominence.
The theory that Gaddy and Ickes proposed fitted nicely in the general perception of the Russian reform that emerged in the West following the default. It is hard to find publications of that time not peppered with accusations of bureaucratic corruption, theft of state assets, and pocketing of Western loans. This atmosphere affected policy-making with hardliners pushing for "tough love" with Russia and preaching that the country was a wreck and irrelevant anymore.
Yet, after gloomy predictions of impeding collapse in Russia failed to materialize, the voice of dissenters became heard. Joseph Stiglitz, the Chief Economist at the World Bank and a fierce critic of the policy of the Washington Consensus, 4 was the first to suggest that it might be we who are wrong and not they. He compared two transitions -Chinese and Russian -and asked the question of why the Chinese did opposite to what we advised and succeeded while the Russians followed the advice and failed? His answer was that assuming market institutions appear if government steps down is naive. Stiglitz did not question the importance of markets in itself but pondered on what form they might assume in transition. Judging by the Chinese experience, he decided that endogenously developed stakeholders' arrangements are superior to the Western-style shareholders' privatization plans in the absence of Western social norms. 5 This clash of policy approaches has not generated quick empirical response. In part, empirical research has lagged behind because of data constraints but the instability of public opinion played a role as well. In the case of the virtual economy, as the initial interest in the hypothesis faded away, it was virtually forgotten. The only exchange of opinions with reference to facts, that the author is aware of, took place in October 1998 in the website publication Johnson's Russia List. 6 It did not lead to conclusive results, for arguments on both sides were based on anecdotal evidence. For example, the four-sector model of Gaddy and Ickes [1998b] introduces notation explicitly referring to Norilsk Nickel and Norilsk Gazprom. While both companies are large and important (Norilsk Nickel was the largest privately-owned company ranked by assets in 1997), their relationship is unrepresentative. 7 Opponents of the hypothesis seized the unfortunate case of gas-for-metal payment scheme to bring counter-examples of large foundries that used different arrangements. This focus on specific companies was unconvincing to both sides. However, as time passes, more evidence becomes available enabling us to contribute to the discussion on the role of barter and arrears in the Russian transition.
In this paper, we test the validity of the hypothesis of the virtual economy. The paper consists of four sections. Section 1 sketches the hypothesis and considers its predictions that we check afterwards. We do not expose the hypothesis in full because some parts are not addressed in the present investigation and other parts were not fully developed by its authors. It is sufficient for our purposes to concentrate attention on the key elements.
Section 2 explains how the statement that barter and arrears distort price signals and facilitate the survival of non-viable companies can be tested. We explore methodologies that are used in determining prices of goods produced by natural monopolies or imported from non-market economies. The literature on the measurement of value-added transferred resulting from tariff barriers is considered. A short discussion on data requirements concludes the section.
Section 3 is the core of the paper. It tests the proposition that Russian prices are not representative of actual values of the traded goods. We supplement domestic prices with prices attained in a market economy and find what the value-added for sectors would be in such circumstances. The result is that twelve out of fifteen sectors generate positive valueadded. The sectors that become 'value-destroying' on price conversion belong to the lowprocessing segment of manufacture. This finding is at odds with the concept of the virtual economy that expects sectors with high degree of processing to be the least productive.
Section 4 introduces several reasons why Russian and world prices differ and checks their validity. We consider the degree of processing, the share of barter and change in trade arrears, effective import tariffs, and price inertia as the explanatory factors. The obtained results point out that the degree of processing and barter explain a large part of the difference. Russian prices are found to be correlated with pre-transition levels and they are converging to the world level at the same time.
The paper concludes with several appendices. Appendix A presents statistical data on the share of barter and arrears in Russia. This topic is relevant to the discussion because nonmonetary exchanges play a key role in the hypothesis and we say few words about it in Section 1. The other appendices provide technical details. We explain the methodology of how sectoral price ratios reported in Section 3 are found and present conversion tables for 232 sampled goods in Appendix B. Appendix C deals with the problem of tariff protection rates that are used to address the question of domestic-world price differentials raised in Section 3. Appendix D explains the methodology of calculating the index of processing that we use in Section 4. 1
The Relevance of Non-Monetary Exchanges to the Virtual Economy
When Gaddy and Ickes proposed the hypothesis of the virtual economy first, they observed bits and pieces of the economic environment that was complex and not described systematically. They detected unusual modes of trade and proposed an unorthodox explanation for this phenomenon. 1 The essence of Gaddy and Ickes's story can be summarized in the following quotation: "At (the) heart (of the virtual economy) is the ultimate pretense that the Russian economy is larger than it really is. … It is the cause of the web of non-payments … from which Russia seemingly cannot emerge. … (T)his story … is a familiar one: The enterprises don't pay their suppliers; they don't pay their workers; they don't pay their taxes."
2 By non-payment Gaddy and Ickes mean that the agents engage in non-monetary exchanges.
We do not attempt to present all arguments and to explain the model that Gaddy and Ickes develop in detail. 3 There is sufficient literature, to which an interested reader is referred. 4 Besides, going into details tends to distract attention. The phenomenon of non-monetary exchanges in Russian transition offers a large number of competing explanations all of them suffering from small inconsistencies. To avoid being drawn into an open-ended discussion of why and how Russia developed trade without money, we focus our attention on two particular features. The first is the notion that prices for bartered and provided in credit goods and services were not of market origin and the second is the suggestion that processing sectors benefited from the non-monetary exchanges.
The hypothesis, that Gaddy and Ickes propose, introduces a two-sector economy producing primary and processed goods. For the sake of illustration let them be oil and machinery. Both goods serve as inputs in the production of one another. Government distorts the market by allowing firms to offset taxes with the delivery of machinery. The demand for machinery grows since taxpayers use them to minimize their tax obligations. The minimization works through barter schemes. If machinery is bartered for oil, it is optimal for both sides to inflate prices. Taxes are paid in nominal terms and, if the barter price for machinery is higher, it covers more of tax liabilities. Then, oil producers can exchange less of oil for machinery delivered later to the government than selling the same amount for money paid in taxes. Machinery producers are happy because they get relatively more oil in barter deals than when they pay in money.
If the government demands paying taxes in money, oil producers stop buying machinery for tax purposes. The reason for barter exchanges disappears and relative prices change. This new situation changes the structure of costs and revenue and machinery producers find that the cost of oil that they use in production exceeds the value of machines.
This logic suggests the structure of our first test. If we know the structure of costs and revenue and if we are able to obtain estimates of market prices with no distortions, we can check the 1 In general, it is not obvious that barter and arrears are of non-market nature, for both modes are legitimate in market economies. Apparently, the degree of non-monetary exchanges struck observers as unusual.
2 See Gaddy and Ickes [1998c] 3 Apparently, the model continues to be refined: As recently as November 7, 2001 Gaddy was introduced as a coauthor of a forthcoming book Russia's Virtual Economy. During the briefing he confirmed that the idea of virtual economy is very much alive (see Brookings Briefing "President Putin Comes to America: Is An Old Adversary Becoming a New Partner?" at www.brookings.edu). 4 Gaddy and Ickes [1998a proposition that the barter hides the inter-sectoral transfer of value. The first problem that we encounter is to find "good" prices that we assume are unobservable at the actual market place according to the hypothesis of virtual economy.
Prices in the Absence of Markets: Methodological Issues
Economists have devised several methods to derive shadow prices for non-marketable goods. Pricing the output of natural monopolies is one example. By definition, a natural monopoly market is distorted in the sense that the allocation of resources is inefficient.
Responding to economic inefficiency that monopolistic pricing introduces, the government corrects the situation by setting a price range. 5 The problem that the government faces is apparently similar to what we have: "good" prices are unobservable and are to be inferred.
The general solution to the problem of monopolistic pricing is to calculate the average cost of production for a number of companies, 6 add a markup, and come to the unit price. This method is unsuited for our purposes. Essentially, it is based on the assumption that, while output prices are distorted, the input prices are not. We cannot make this assumption because the hypothesis of virtual economy conjectures that the values of both outputs and inputs are set outside of the market.
The second method originates in the international trade practice. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) acknowledges the possibility of "dumping" and legitimizes the use of countervailing duties in trade conflicts.
7 By definition, dumping involves non-market pricing. To bring the announced price back to its market level, the trade authority of a country affected levies a duty that covers the difference.
The situation of dumping corresponds to what Gaddy and Ickes allege Russia faced in 1997 in reverse: announced prices were higher than what would be efficient. This similarity of situations suggests that we are able to use international trade practices to construct a methodology of finding market values for Russian goods. Unfortunately, this approach applies to tradable goods only.
Let us consider in detail how the value of countervailing duties is calculated in practice. The trade authority can use the same cost pricing approach as in the case of natural monopoly. It takes the average price at which the imported good is sold domestically in the exporting country, and finds the difference between exported and domestic price determining the duty. Again, this method is based on the assumption that domestic prices are efficient, which contradicts to the setting of the hypothesis we consider.
If an imported good is deemed to be valued outside of the market of the exporting country, its price structure is totally discounted and replaced with the prices determined in an "analogue 5 In limit, the range collapses to a single price. 6 For example, we can use averaged cost structure for a group of utility providers of adjacent provinces or states. 7 See GATT [1986, Article VI]. country". This approach uses the same assumptions as we do and is taken as the basis for our methodology. 8 The problem of the analogue country comes next.
The concept of the analogue country is not well specified in trade documents and the World Trade Organization does not mention it on its website. The European Union is explicit about the concept. 9 Article 2(7) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 states that "In the case of imports from non-market economy countries … normal value shall be determined on the basis of the price … in a market economy third country". The EU fails to set explicit criteria for determining how the analogue country is to be selected noting only that the analogue country "shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner, due account being taken of any reliable information made available at the time of selection". 10 Further examination of legal documents related to countervailing duties imposed by the EU has shown that it uses the following criteria selecting the analogue country: 11 -a country has been used previously in a similar investigation -a country cooperates in the investigation -it has several producers leading to strong domestic competition -the price of the product in this country is similar to that in the EU and the costs of inputs is similar to the cost structure of the exporting country Taken together, these requirements impose severe limits on the list of potential candidates and the effort by the EU to make the full use of the clause on "not unreasonable choice" is perfectly understandable.
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We propose to use the US as the analogue country. This country produces a wide variety of goods and is similar in geographic size and the wealth of natural resources to Russia. This country is often taken for two-country comparative studies. The US economic data is readily available. Finally, America is believed to have the freest market in the world and its prices arguably reflect the most efficient allocation of resources, the condition that we attempt to find. 12 For example, in the anti-dumping case referring to the import of urea from Russia, the EU committee recommended to use the cost structure provided by the only producer in Slovakia as the benchmark against which the costs of Russian urea manufacturers were recalculated. The proposal of EU importers to use Canadian data on the ground that Slovakia does not extract gas (a major component in urea production) was rejected because Canada did not answer on the lengthy questionnaire sent during the hearings. Brazil appears the most often as a candidate but the author has not been able to find consistent data from this country. 13 If geographic proximity would be the most definite factor, Germany is a better candidate. The author has been advised that German data are well detailed for comparative purposes than American's but America appears to be 4
The experiment that we conduct in this paper differs from regular trade practice of assessing the countervailing duty in one important aspect. Unlike considering a single product, against which a complaint is lodged, efficient prices for a wide array of products are to be found while accounting for secondary effects introduced by technological constraints. The latter is introduced through the use of input-output table.
In this study, we face serious data limitations. The Russian State Committee for Statistics (GKS) does not publish much data and what is published is distributed through its commercial branch that limits further access. There are available broadly aggregated input-output tables for 1995-7. It is overly restrictive because only ten sectors are present and the main important sectors of mining and manufacture are merged.
14 To come around data constraints, we choose the following strategy. We take the Russian inputoutput table for 1997 based on GKS [2000b, Table 4 .3] and construct a more detailed table using RAS approach. 15 The entries of the table are converted its entries into US dollars using sectoral price ratios introduced in the next section. The resulting cost-revenue structure shows what would happen with the Russian economy if it momentarily switches to the US prices. Assuming that the US prices are efficient, this experiment provides a numerical evaluation of the claim that Russian domestic prices hide the value-destroying nature of manufacturing sectors.
Our methodology of finding the transfer of value across sectors using shadow prices is similar to the approach pioneered in Corden [1966] . Corden asks the question of what is the value of protection that industry j receives because of import tariffs on both good j and material inputs used in its production. He determines the unit value transferred as 16 The author is thankful to J. Clark Leith of the University of Western Ontario for pointing on the similarity of approaches.
prices are found by using price ratios for economic sectors constructed below and, second, the ratios are used to recalculate sectoral revenues and costs.
We collect a sample of individual prices for the same goods and the same time period in both Russia and the USA assuming, initially, that goods do not differ in quality. where Factor j is the conversion factor that is the ratio of the unit of measurement in Russia to the American unit of good j.
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Because we are interested in the sectoral price ratios, we have to choose a method of aggregation. It is standard in the literature to take the value of product as its weight. We have two estimates of values that can be taken individually or as a group: the values of Russian products measured at Russian and American prices. However, we have explicitly introduced the assumption that observed Russian prices are not market determined, which makes the proposition to use them as the weights to be inconsistent with the rest of the paper. Therefore, we calculate the weight of good j using the US prices applied to Russian physical output According to Gaddy and Ickes if the "value-destroying" sectors go bankrupt, the economy will improve in the long run. They mean, apparently, that the output of the sectors can be replaced with import. In fact, the import of electricity accounts for less than one percent of total consumption and the share is unlikely to grow. The sector of iron and steel is a major exporting and not importing sector. The only sector whose products are imported significantly is chemical manufacturing but it is a large exporter as well. In total, it seems implausible that importing helps if bankruptcy is what envisioned for the sectors. Finally, our estimate of "new" GDP is lower than that calculated by the World Bank. Thus, the conjecture that GDP will grow at new prices does not hold the ground.
To take a closer look on the changes that have occurred after the price conversion, we have constructed where Value stands for either revenue or costs for sector i and superscripts Rus and US mean its ruble and recalculated dollar value. WBPriceRatio is the ratio of GDP in rubles to the GDP estimate calculated by the World Bank at the PPP exchange rate. Table 2 divides sectors into two groups according to whether their ratio of value-added is below or above half of the ratio for total economy. The first part comprises metallurgy, agriculture, and sectors that are heavily dependent on fuels: electricity, oil processing, and chemicals. Three of these sectors generate negative value-added and are "virtual" in the Gaddy and Ickes's sense. The rest come close. A casual look at their cost structure indicates that costs at shadow prices grow mostly due to the increase in prices of fuels (oil, gas, and coal) for all sectors apart from agriculture.
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Let us take a closer look at three sectors, which generate negative value-added at the shadow prices. The change in the share of input cost is reported in 8 where superscripts Con denotes the revenue or total cost of input i converted at the price ratio and Nom stands for the value determined at nominal (observable) prices. We see that the change in the cost of fuels coupled with changes in transport and trade margins are responsible for dropping value-added of the sectors to the negative territory. This structure of changes in the value of material cost is consistent with the observation made by Gaddy and Ickes: "three fat men" of Russian economy 21 support other sectors with relatively low prices on their products. The reference of Gazprom helping to the sector of iron and steel that we have mentioned before appears to be reasonable as well.
While the importance of fuel costs is to be expected given our previous discussion, significance of transport and trade margins is more troubling. Recall that we do not calculate shadow prices for the sectors of transportation and trade but base their supposed "market" values on the World Bank estimate of Russian GDP at the PPP exchange rate. If the shadow prices for sectors with non-tradable services are evaluated at the official exchange rate instead, chemical manufacturing remains the only sector with the negative value-added on conversion. Therefore, the significance of transport and trade on conversion depends critically on the assumption about the relative productivity of these sectors that we make.
Up to now we have proceeded on the assumption that the US prices are representative of the market value of Russian goods. In fact, it might not be the case. Usually, Russian goods are considered to be of inferior quality compared with its Western counterparts. We want to explore if adjusting for quality change the results obtained so far. It is not clear from economic literature how to measure quality. One suggestion is to compare domestic prices for Russian and imported goods with similar functional properties. The difference in prices, if any, provides a quantitative estimate of quality on the basis of revealed preferences. Unfortunately, this approach is infeasible due to data constraints.
We propose a different method. Assuming that capital and labor is less productive in Russia, the degree of processing for sectors can serve as a weighting coefficient that introduces quality in the evaluation of shadow prices for domestic goods. The next step is to determine the methodology for finding the degree of processing.
First, the sectors are divided in primary and processing. Essentially, we list primary goods and find the share of its value in total revenue using data on the composition of sectoral output (see Appendix D for details). The primary good is defined to be a good naturally available such as minerals, raw fuels, and unprocessed lumber plus raw agricultural products and electricity.
Next, we calculate the index of processing, which is the processing value accrued to the unit value of primary inputs. The indices found cannot be used in determining shadow prices like we have done before. They are calculated on the assumption that processing is 'virtual', in the sense that it does not add any value to the final product.
22 Thus, the impact that the introduction of estimated quality would have on the value-added generated by sectors is to be assessed differently.
We consider the proposition that domestic prices come closer to shadow prices if adjusted for quality is a natural supplement to the hypothesis of virtual economy. If quality is the parameter that biases our results, its inclusion should reduce the gap. Then, the variance for the sample of ratios adjusted is to be smaller than for the same sample involving unadjusted ratios. The results are reported in Table 4 . The variance is calculated around the mean normalized to unity. The result reported in Table 4 does not show that the adjustment for quality reduces the variance of price ratios. Thus, we cannot state that quality, approximated by the degree of processing in this case, is an important factor that biases our results.
Explaining Price Differentials
The results obtained lead to the question of why price ratios differ so remarkably across the sectors. There are several potentially valid hypotheses to be explored.
Suppose the processing is less productive in Russia, in the sense that the same level of processing results in the production of goods of lower quality. Then, the ratio of domestic to American prices should fall as the degree of processing increases.
The same result is obtained if the cost of factors of production relative to the cost of inputs is lower in Russia. Then, the more processing is involved, the less is the relative price of domestically produced goods given that markets are competitive.
We use the index of processing introduced in the previous chapter and regress it on the price ratios. Figure (Table D1 ) and price ratio (rubles per dollar scaled, Table B3 , general consumption) for 10 processing sectors.
Let us consider what the detected correlation implies. The index of processing represents, in its simple form, the ratio of unit cost of primary inputs to the value of processed output. The other variable represents the ratio of Russian to American values of the processed goods. As the index of processing falls, which corresponds to a higher level of processing, Russian goods become relatively cheaper compared to their US counterparts.
Since we do not discriminate between the difference in quality (as we have assumed before) and the relative cost of factors of production, it is unclear what of two reasons is the most important. Yet, in both cases domestic prices convey information on the market evaluation of goods, which contradicts the proposition that they are 'virtual'. 24 Another explanation of the price differentials is that Russian prices, unlike its American counterparts, include additional charges such as interest on overdue trade credit or transaction costs associated with barter.
The late payment is expected to rise as the flow of receivables that firms accumulate increases. 25 The scatter diagram of the share of the change in receivables to total trade and price ratios is presented on Figure 2 . It shows that the parameters are weakly negatively correlated. The OLS regression finds that 24 The correlation between the index of processing and price ratio is not very robust. The author has attempted to add agriculture and electricity to processing sectors because they do not fit the definition of primary industries provided above and t-statistics has dropped below the 95% significance level. 25 We choose the flow over stock of receivables as being closer related to the time frame that we cover. Table A5 ) and price ratios (rubles per dollar scaled, Table B3 , general consumption) for 15 sectors. Both single regressions do not find that the difference in trade practices is an important explanation of price differentials. This result suggests that the emphasis of peculiar trade arrangements as the main price distortions is misplaced.
Next, we consider whether the difference in prices detected can be attributed to import barriers. 26 To determine the relative sizes of tariff regulations, we take import tariff rates effective in 1997 and find sectoral rates using the same aggregation procedure as used in the construction of price ratios. We consider that domestic price regulation amounts to trade barrier on export and add the difference between domestic and export price to tariff rates for affected sectors. 27 The general formula that finds the rate of price protection for product j is 26 We exclude the issue of export barriers because it requires constructing tariff structures for main Russian trade partners, which is complicated and, in general, irrelevant to the allegation of inflated values of output that we explore. 27 The last consideration affects the sector of natural gas extraction only. While the domestic price for electricity is similarly controlled, it is higher than uncontrolled export price. This fact suggests that it is price floor that is set domestically and not price ceiling. Since export and import prices are practically identical ($ 24.26 and $ 24.31 per 1,000 kW-H), we consider that electricity sector is tariff-protected. Change in receivables Price ratio (scaled by the highes price ratio) Table A6 ) and price ratios (rubles per dollar scaled, Table B3 , general consumption) for 15 sectors.
We expect that if import barriers explain price differences between domestic and world market prices, they should be positively correlated with price ratios. The scatter diagram of tariff protection rates and price ratios is shown on This result is to be expected. According to the theory, in the perfect world the price arbitrage is eventually dissipated as traders take the opportunity to earn extra profit. The only difference in prices remaining is the value of trade barriers. Both the sign and the significance of our result are congruent with the theory.
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Single variable regression analysis shows that modes of trade are not significantly correlated with the price ratios. Let us check that multivariate regression yields a similar result. We regress all four parameters of interest on the price ratio getting 28 However, the significance depends critically on the sector of gas extraction, which is an outlier. Without this sector, the level of significance drops to 1.291. T-statistics for coefficients improves to 2.53 and 3.42, which is significant on the 95 percent level. Adjusted R-square is 0.715 for the exercise.
We conclude that both the use of barter and the difference in processing explain much of the detected price variation. These factors make opposite impacts: while the use of barter rises Russian prices relative to the US level, more processing lowers them. The growth in trade arrears and protection tariffs appear to have insignificant impact on prices. The first finding implies that traders do not systematically account for possible delay in payments. The second suggests that a statistically significant relationship between import fees and price differentials that we have found in [13] is not robust, the fact that we have already mentioned in footnote [35] .
Finally, we consider if individual Russian prices possess inertia remained from the Soviet time. This exercise addresses the conjecture that Russia has simulated market reforms preserving, in fact, a command economy with state-regulated prices.
Defining inertia is not a straightforward exercise. We have to determine an initial position, target, and the speed of approaching the target. Let Russian pre-transition prices of 1991 be the beginning and the US prices of 1997 -the target, while the position that Russian prices had in 1997 be measuring the speed of approaching the target if any progress is present.
Since prices are measured in different units (pre-and mid-transition rubles and dollars), it is necessary to bring them to the same denominator. We propose to use the price of some basic product as the numeraire. Since the prices of electricity and gas were controlled in Russian transition, the price of one metric ton of oil is chosen.
Russian prices for 1991 are recalculated from average prices for December 1991 and price indices available for a sequence of years 1992-7 for 140 goods out of 232 present in the sample. We use data from GKS [1998d, tables 2.18, 2.20, 4.6, 6.8] The correlation detected is hardly surprising because the sample includes relatively cheap and expensive products that preserve their ranking in time and across the border. The important thing is that both parameters explain a portion of the Russian prices of 1997 in our sample and not contradict one another. The single regressions find that the Russian prices of 1991 serve as a better explanation than the US prices of 1997. While together they are able to explain 0.877 of the variance, the first explains 0.845 and the second -0.716. Therefore, price inertia appears to be significant. Still, the impact of the world prices cannot be rejected on the basis of found evidence.
Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the discussion on the nature of transitional Russian price structure to the field of empirical research. The previous discourse has generated a large number of propositions that have not been tested in a systematic manner.
We have taken the hypothesis of virtual economy as our starting point and checked the proposition that Russian domestic prices have been deliberately distorted to conceal the valuedestroying nature of economically non-viable but politically important sectors. We have recalculated the value-added for economic sectors using the method of shadow pricing and found that three out of fifteen sectors correspond to the definition of value destruction in the sense that at shadow prices the cost of material inputs exceeds the value of its output. Moreover, the analysis of their shadow cost structure indicates that the main cost increases are associated with the inputs supplied by state-controlled monopolies. This finding is consistent with the proposition that politics is involved in price setting in Russian transition.
The sectors that are found generating negative value are electricity, iron and steel, and chemical and petrochemical manufacturing. These sectors are usually viewed as industries producing lowprocessing goods. Other sectors, including producers of high-processed goods, benefit if Russian prices converge to the world level. This finding is opposite to what Gaddy and Ickes suggest: prices are distorted to support sectors at the high-processing end.
The implication of the hypothesis that if the "value-destroying" sectors go bankrupt the economy will improve in the long run appears to be dubious. First, it means, apparently, that the output of the outgoing sectors can be replaced with import. In fact, the import of electricity is miniscule and its share is unlikely to grow on technical grounds. Iron and steel is a major exporting and not importing sector. Therefore, we have to assume that its export is subsidized by the state to infer that the closure of the sector increases GDP in the long run. This is a bold statement and seems unlikely at the moment. The only sector whose products are imported in a large degree is chemical manufacturing and, if it goes out of business, the GDP might eventually grow. Yet, taken together, it seems implausible that importing helps if bankruptcy is what Gaddy and Ickes envision for these sectors. Second, our estimate of "new" total GDP is lower than that calculated by the World Bank. Thus, the conjecture that combined effect of the closure on GDP will be positive is overstretched.
These results have been obtained using the assumption that the US prices are representative of the market value of Russian goods, which ignores the problem of quality variation. We have proposed to use the degree of processing as a proxy for quality and considered if accounting for it brings prices closer. The result has been negative implying that quality is not a significant factor that biases our findings.
We have attempted to explain the detected differences in prices by testing several hypotheses both individually and as a group. We have regressed the relative cost of factors to material inputs, barter and receivables shares in revenue, and effective trade tariffs on price ratios. The results indicate that accounting for differences in the values of factors of production explains a significant portion of price differentials. Since we do not discriminate between the difference in quality (as we have assumed before) and the relative cost of factors of production, it is unclear what of two reasons is the most important. Yet, in both cases domestic prices convey information on the market evaluation of goods, which contradicts the proposition that they are 'virtual'.
The use of barter appears to influence Russian prices but only in a multivariate regression. The change in accumulated trade receivables has an insignificant impact. This result suggests that the emphasis on peculiar trade arrangements as being the main driving force determining domestic prices is misplaced.
The positive impact that effective tariff rates have on prices is to be expected according to the theory and it is shown to be present. Yet, the result is not robust and depends on the price control for the sector of gas extraction to stay statistically significant. This finding indicates that domestic traders practically discount tariffs while setting prices.
Finally, we have considered if individual Russian prices possess inertia remained from the Soviet time. Brought to the same numeraire, domestic prices in transition show positive and significant correlation with both pre-transition prices and world level. This finding implies that Russian prices have been relatively inflexible in transition, which leads to two potential interpretations. The first is congruent with the previous statement of politics being involved. It is possible that interest groups remained from the Soviet time resist price changes. Another explanation is that Soviet price administrators did in fact a good job and major market corrections have been unnecessary in transition. 29 The fact that domestic prices have moved closer to world level indicates unequivocally that the Russian economy becomes more open. The last statement seems to be uncontroversial.
Regarding the hypothesis of virtual economy, the evidence is either ambiguous or unfavorable to it. To serve as a building block towards the theory of economic transition, the hypothesis is to be better structured and generate clear predictions. It appears that, in its present form, the hypothesis belongs to the area of bold conjectures, which is not testable by definition.
The general impression from the exercises conducted is that the structure of Russian price system is not well understood. It would be interesting to learn more about what kind of market signals transitional prices convey (or suppress) and why. This line of research will advance our understanding of both the behavior of Russian economy in transition and how markets work after a major shock in general.
The issue of barter and arrears and why they have become so widespread in transition is important in itself. Do non-monetary modes of exchange represent a normal evolutionary development for an emerging market or they are anomalies outside of the market? Answering this question will enable us to better understand the nature of transition and contribute to the discussion that the proponents and opponents of the Washington Consensus continue to lead.
Appendix A: Non-monetary Exchanges in the Russian Transition
Since non-monetary exchanges play a prominent role in the hypothesis, it is necessary to consider how important they were in 1997. Available data is sketchy and we attempt to systematize it here. We divide the presentation in two sections depending on the source of information.
Section A1: Statistical and Survey Data
The existing research on the role that barter and arrears play in transition is built around two sources of information: surveys of industrial enterprises and statistics provided by governmental offices. Aukutsionek [1998] presents a sample of about 200 companies 30 whose managers have answered the question on the share of barter deals in its sales (see Table A1 , sorted by magnitude). This work is apparently the first investigation of the phenomenon of barter in Russia and it has attracted considerable attention. The Institute of Economic Transition [IET, 2001] has conducted a different survey. It uses a sample of about 1,000 enterprises and asks about the importance of barter in both sales and purchases (see Table A2 , sorted by magnitude in sales). These two surveys differ by both sectoral organization and time period covered.
The IET finds that the shares of barter in sales and purchases are highly correlated with the correlation coefficient being 0.964. This result is reasonable because the accounting values of exchanged goods should be the same in sales and purchases.
A comparison of both surveys shows that barter was more likely to occur in the sectors of chemical manufacturing and ferrous metallurgy and less likely in food processing. While it is 30 The English version of the publication explains that the rate of response varied around 200 whereas the number of approached companies was about 500. The Russian Economic Barometer has prepared the questionnaire. 31 The subsequent work traditionally refers to this paper (see Woodruff [1999, Fig. 4, p.148 hard to propose a hypothesis explaining the ubiquity of barter in the first two sectors, the example of food procession suggests that the producers of final goods receive payments in cash relatively more often.
The results obtained in two surveys are somewhat incongruent. 32 This finding indicates that either the share of barter varied in 1997 or sampling errors are present. Data on tax offsets -that are barter equivalents for government-business relationships -are unavailable in disaggregated form. The website of the Russian Ministry for Taxes and Fees reports that taxpayers contributed 152,004 billion rubles in cash to the Federal Budget and 184,361 billion rubles to other budgets. 33 Given that the total tax collection by the Federal and other levels of government was 243,548 and 328,989 billion rubles respectively, 34 the share of tax offsets to tax collection were 37.6% for the federal and 44.0% for the territorial budgets. If we add the change in tax arrears for 1997 as being implicit subsidies (30,100 and 23,540 billion to the federal and territorial budgets, see GKS [1998b, Table 2 .17]), the share of barter and arrears to assessed taxes rises to 44.4% and 47.7% respectively. These numbers are about the same as the share of inter-enterprise barter reported in Tables 1 and 2 . This observation is inconsistent with the claim that unwanted goods have been ultimately dumped to the government.
It is reasonable to expect that a part of the bills be paid to the extra-budgetary funds in-kind. Gaddy and Ickes provide anecdotal evidence on social offsets (see Gaddy and Ickes [1998b, Appendix] . 35 Yet, we have found no statistical data on the value of offsets that extra-budgetary funds granted to payers. 32 The correlation coefficient for 7 sectors present in both tables is 0.692, metallurgy combined with the same weight. 33 See http://www.nalog.ru/stats/new/zhiv97-98-99.shtml 34 See Table 9 in IET, "Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, Year 1997, Issue 18 ", available at http://www.iet.ru/ (in Russian). 35 They cite a newspaper report that claims that a Samara chemical plant paid in pesticides for some undisclosed obligations and this product eventually became the property of the Pension Fund of the Republic of Mari El. It is unclear from the citation whether the payment was made directly to the Pension Fund or the Federal Government has collected taxes in-kind and transferred the goods to the Pension Fund. The Federal Government is obliged to contribute to the pension funds for federal employees.
Data on the payment of wages in-kind is reported in the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) in section "Adult Questionnaire". 36 We process 4,234 entries, for which matching of the reported occupation with a particular economic sector is possible (job descriptions are taken from the International Labor Organization codes for primary occupations) 37 and present them in Table A3 . Source: Author's calculations based on RLMS, Round 7, Adult Questionnaire. Table A3 shows that the payment of wages in kind occurs less frequently than inter-enterprise barter. This observation is consistent with the previous suggestion that barter is not common for final goods.
The numbers in tables A1-3 indicate the low bound of non-monetary trade because they apparently exclude specific modes of exchange. Regarding inter-enterprise barter, it is unclear whether the respondents consider such non-monetary means of exchange as bills of exchange issued by large industrial companies. In general, they are expected to be paid in cash on maturity but if a company refuses to honor a bill, the bill holder is presented with a difficult choice. Since initiating bankruptcy is a costly exercise, sometimes it is easier to find a buyer getting paid with a discount. As a result, there is a market for these bills, which begin circulating as quasi-money. former is traded at heavy discount. As to the wages paid in-kind, the RLMS respondents were asked about goods received in lieu of wages. 38 This question was misleading because it ignored such modes of in-kind payment as credit extended at stores belonging to the firm to cover wage arrears and agreements to pay in-kind for utilities that many firms established with local providers.
Data on arrears come mostly from the State Committee on Statistics (GKS, in Russian abbreviation) that reports overdue credit and debit accounts. 39 In addition, Clarke [1997] supplies numbers on wage arrears that fill gaps for fuel industries. The Center for Economic conjuncture at the Russian Government provides a relatively detailed account on tax arrears for JanuarySeptember 1997 (see CEC [1998] ). Table A4 presents the stock of arrears at the beginning of 1997 and Table A5 details the flows sorted by the share of arrears in sales. Sources: GKS 1998a, Table 6 .12; 1998b, Tables 3.58-9; 1998e, various tables related to different sectors; 1999, Table 10 .33; and Clarke [1997] . For the sectors with asterisk data on payables are on January 1, 1998. The total payables are larger than the sum of arrears presented in the table because debt owed to other non-financial creditors is omitted. 38 The question was formulated as "Have you received in the last 30 days at this enterprise in lieu of payment for your labor something from its production or from the production of another enterprise?" 39 Technically, the overdue credit comprises unpaid bills issued more than 3 months ago. Tables A4 and A5 are aggregates of accounting statements that taxpayers submit to fiscal authorities. 40 Receivables indicate the share of goods and services delivered to customers prior to the payment. They include both normal trade credit and unpaid bills that will be written off as unrecoverable losses in the end. Payables show how much the reporting firm owes to its suppliers, workers, and the government in unpaid taxes. The nature of firm's creditors is detailed in the balance sheet. Tables A4 and A5 show that the sectors dominated by the state-controlled monopolies (natural gas, electricity, and railroads) and the sector of coal mining are large creditors to the rest of the economy. This observation is consistent with the claim that the government supports the economy by allowing debtors to accumulate unpaid bills to the first three sectors. Sources: GKS 1998a, Table 6. 12; 1998b, Tables 3.58-9; , Table 10.33. Clarke [1997 Another observation appears to contradict the subsidizing nature of this credit because large creditors happen to be large debtors as well. This is a general feature of data reported in Table  A4 . 42 Yet, if we assume that nominal prices are not representative of the market value of goods and services, the contradiction disappears.
Numbers in
The changes in the value of receivables and payables that occurred in 1997 are highly correlated with their stock at the beginning of the year (the correlation coefficients are 0.807 and 0.856 respectively). This observation suggests that the trends in arrears were preserved throughout the year.
Section A2: Accounting Estimates of Barter and Arrears
Another source of data that we can explore is accounting information that publicly traded companies disclose following the rules set by the Federal Committee on Securities. While the firms are not required to report the value of bartered goods explicitly, it is possible to derive its proxy using indirect indicators. If the value of total revenue is reduced by the sum of money payments and the positive change in receivables throughout the year, the resulting number is a close estimate of the value of barter in sales. The formula that we use is Source: Author's sample and calculations. Observations with the change in arrears for more than 500 of total revenue (total costs) have been excluded from the consideration as outlays.
Data on arrears are reported explicitly and we find their share using the formula
where X stands for the total revenue or costs depending on what arrears we measure: receivables or payables.
Total revenue is reported in line 10 of the Financial Statement, line 30 of the Report on Money Transactions provides the value of money received for supplied goods and services, and numbers for long and short-term receivables at the beginning and the end of the year appear in lines 230 and 240 of the Balance Sheet. The stock and the change in long and short-term receivables and payables are reported in the Balance Sheet, lines 230, 240, and 620. We report the ratios of the change in receivables to total revenue and the change in payables to the total costs. The latter is presented in line 20 of the Financial Statement.
We have collected accounting and financial information for 3,605 Russian companies for 1997 using a number of sources. 43 The sample includes companies from 78 out of 89 Russian regions and represents a large variety of sectors. For the purpose of presentation, we divide the sample in 38 groups that loosely comply with the industrial classification OKONKh. 44 Table A6 shows the results that are similar to what other tables present. This finding suggests that accounting information can provide us with reliable data on non-monetary exchanges. 43 Total number does not correspond with where IndexQ year is the index of the change in output in physical units and IndexP year is the index of the change in prices for the year.
The labor expenses for 1997 are found as a ratio of the ratios of labor cost shares to revenues for 1997 and 1995 times labor expenses taken from the input-output table for 1995. Data on the shares of wage bill and social contributions are from GKS [1998a, Table 7 .6] and on the return on costs -from GKS [1998b, 
We assume that the distribution of mixed profit among industries is identical in structure to the values reported in the input-output table for 1995. Indirect taxes are divided according to the structure of tax collection for 1997 as reported CEC [1998] . The sector of textile and footwear is assumed to stay as the only recipient of subsidies allocated to manufacture in 1997. The valueadded at producer's price represents the sum of labor compensation, profits, and net indirect taxes, while the cost of intermediate products is the difference between the total output and the value-added. 45 The last four sectors are not necessary for our analysis since we do not find its price ratios. We follow the procedure used to construct the input-output table for 1995 that contains 25 sectors (see Ivanenko [2001] ). 46 The depreciation is equal to the capital cost allowances.
After horizontal rows of aggregate numbers for total output are filled, we proceed with vertical rows of aggregate numbers for consumption. To arrive at numbers for intermediate consumption, we subtract net export, final consumption by households, government and NGO, and changes in inventories from the total domestic output. For export (and import), we use the ratio of reported values for 1995 and 1997 (see GKS [1996 , Table 357 and 1998c The change of inventories for producers is from data on the stock of finished products in GKS [1998a, Table 1 .15] apart from the sectors of fuels and other manufacturing. The latter are found by dividing the residual of the total value according to the weights of sectors in the inventories for the input-output table 1995. The change in inventories for consumers is found as the matrix multiplication of the costs of production from the input-output table for 1995 times the changes in the stock of intermediate goods from GKS [1998a, Table 7 .7] excluding fuels. The latter sectors are found as the change in physical inventories (see GKS [1998c, Table 2 .63]) times average prices for fuels from GKS [1998d, Table 4 .11]. We assume that the change of inventories for traders follows the same pattern as reported in the input-output table for 1995. Similarly, the final consumption preserves the same pattern of 1995. Labor expenses 27,296 9,544 8,706 3,009 11,165 18,341 17,148 19,005 Gross profit 65,697 45,349 24,914 28,848 7,000 11,702 22,079 4,822 Net taxes on material inputs and output Value-added at producer's price 102,471 71,677 36,097 38,713 20,658 32,474 43,123 26,925 Total output 205,939 94,649 142,428 60,483 41,751 121,367 91,430 117,349 Sources: GKS 1996, Table 357; 1998a, Tables 1.9, 1.15, 7.6, 7.7, 8.1, 8.4; 1998b, Tables 3.11, 3.23, 3.26; 1998c, Tables 2.63, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9; 1998d, Table 4.11; 2000a, After the numbers for the sums of the rows and columns are determined, we use RAS procedure to update the input-output table for 1995 to 1997. The procedure is explained in UN [1999] and it is generally used if an input-output table is unavailable for a particular year. We take the variant of the table developed for Ivanenko [2001] . It contains 25 sectors (see Table B1 ). Finally, banking margin is divided among all sectors taking the data on credits and loans (see GKS [1998b, Table 3 .23 and 3.26]) as proxies for sectoral credit rates. We add the margin to the cost of banking services, while transportation and trade margins are added to the intermediate costs of transportation and trade. The table and its constituent parts are shown below.
Having constructed the input-output table, we proceed with finding price conversion rates. We take Russian producer's prices from GKS [1998d, Table 4 .11 and 6.8]. Since there is no reported numbers for the sector of other manufacturing, we take consumer's prices for six items belonging to the group GKS [1998d, Table 2 .20]. 47 The prices for few missing products are deducted in various ways. For bailed hay, the price is from the publication "Methods of calculating pure income in dairy farming" taken as the ratio of the suggested prices for hay and animal feed times the price of animal feed for 1997.
48
47 Transportation and trade margins plus net direct taxes might make consumer's prices higher than producer's but we discount this possibility for the group because we have no proxies to adjust the numbers. Besides, the US prices are taken from commercial sources representing consumer prices apart from publishing. 48 See http://www.aris.krasnodar.ru/metodika2/met2_14.htm Labor expenses
117,955
Gross profit
39,295
Net taxes on material inputs and output
14,263
Value-added at producer's price
157,858
Total output
327,542
The price for wall and floor tiles is from the data on the cost of construction materials for construction purposes adjusted by using the price of brick (see GKS [1998d, Table 5 .8]). The price of pulp is connected to the producer's price of paper through the ratio of export prices of pulp and paper. Several prices are from commercial reports of various Russian companies that are assumed to be representative. 49 The prices of methanol and ammonia for three months of 31 1997 are from the journal "Prices on Russian Market" published by NIIEMPEX. 50 In total we get a sample of 232 products, which is close to the mark of 256 that Ark and Timmer [2001, Section 3.4 ] considers sufficient for a comparison of manufacturing.
As a rule, American prices are found as the ratio of the total value divided by the output in physical units. We use for manufacturing and utilities data reported by the Bureau of Census in Current Industrial Reports for 1997 and Census Series EC97. For agriculture data are from Statistical Reports, historical data by the Department of Agriculture and for minerals -from U.S. Geological Survey published by U.S. Department of the Interior. Some missing numbers are taken from trade catalogs or financial reports of large companies. 51 The prices of peat, raw diamonds, live fish, and buckwheat are from Canadian data reported by Statistics Canada and converted in the US Dollars at the market exchange rate. Since American producer's prices are unavailable for irons, sunflower oil, and buckwheat meal, we take prices for close analogues instead. 52 The list of sampled goods is presented in Table B2 .
To convert American units into Russian units of measurement, we use a number of formal and informal sources. For example, data on the size of hide in decimeters, density of painting, weights of bushels of grains and fruits are taken from commercial reports. Tables used by the US Bureau of Census, Department of Energy, Ecological Service, US custom officials were helpful as well.
Products are aggregated in 15 groups using Russian industrial classification OKONKh. We take the ratio of the value of a product in the US Dollars to the total value of sampled goods of a sector as the weight and find the price ratio PriceRatio i for sector I as the ratio of Russian to American prices. After simplifications, the formula for the exchange rate becomes where Factor j is the conversion factor that accounts for difference in the unit of measurement. Russian output comes mostly from GKS [1998a, Section 11, different tables] but several entries are not available at that source. We use regional data reported by the Russian Ministry of Agriculture, Mineral Group regarding mining, and data from commercial analytical reports to fill the gaps.
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Since we ignore Russian prices completely as being unrepresentative of market exchanges, weights do not include a combination of US output measured in Russian prices along with its opposite as it is usually is done in two-country comparative studies. Some products are consumed by one sector and they are counted for that sector only. This is not vital for our research but it should improve the accuracy of our results. We consider iron ore, coke, bauxite, pulp, yarns, animal feed, and hay to be products intended for internal consumption. They are not included in the sample of products that are used by more than one sector. As it is seen in Table B3 , the price ratios for products consumed within sectors and in general do not differ much. Table  Rate  Table  o   −   = where Rate is a diagonal matrix of the rates. In actual calculations, we divide the entries of the input-output matrix by the relevant rates element by element because for several diagonal entries internal Price ratios should be used. 54 It is interesting to note that items that are produced and consumed within sectors tend to be over-priced relative to its other products. The sample is too small to make any inference what forces might be at play 55 It is found as the ratio of GDP in rubles to the estimate of GDP at PPP exchange rates made by the World Bank. . Finally, the sectoral protection rates are found as the ratio of the total values of import barrier and the value of output of the sampled goods. Sources: Tariff rates are aggregated by the author using individual rates from the Governmental Decree N 1560 "On the Classification of Products Designated for Foreign-Trade and Custom Tariffs of the Russian Federation" dated December 27, 1996 and weights calculated from the sample presented in Table A2 ; tariff and price protection rates are author's calculations Table C1 presents the sectoral protection rates. Note that the rate for natural gas extraction is negative because the average export price of gas (unregulated) exceeds its domestic price (regulated). 60 The situation is reversed for electricity where its domestic price (regulated) is higher than the average export price. This observation implies that the domestic price of gas is lower than it would be with no price regulation and perfect competition whereas the price response of electricity sector in similar conditions is uncertain. 60 We take the average price of natural gas that manufacturing establishments pay and not producer's price for this exercise. The reason is that it is the former price that is fixed by the government. It includes transport and trade margin. The average price for manufacturing establishments is from GKS [1998e, Table 24 .23]. However, considering the value of output if prices are unregulated, we add trade and transport margins to the sector of gas extraction and subtract this amount from the output of transport and trade sectors. The difference is divided between the last sectors in the proportion to their total margins for the whole economy. T is the transposed matrix of costs, Revenue, Share, and Index are diagonal matrices of the sectoral revenue, the share of processing, and the index of processing respectively and i is the identity vector. Data on costs and revenues come from the input-output table for 1997 (see Table B1 ).
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